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NOTES
DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR A COMPUTER PROGRAM'S
NONLITERAL ELEMENTS: IS IT AS EASY AS 1*2*3*?*
The Copyright Act of 19761 provides copyright protection to computer
programs. 2 However, the Copyright Act does not provide unlimited protec-
tion to computer programs. 3 Much confusion and debate among courts,4
* A version of this Article was submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1990) [hereinafter Copyright Act].
2. See Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 101 (defining computer program as used in
Copyright Act). The Copyright Act defines a computer program as a set of statements or
instructions that a computer uses directly or indirectly to bring about a certain result. Id.; see
also L. KtrrrEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROmCTION/LIAm~rrY/LAw/FoRms §§ 2.01[11-[l1]
(1990) (discussing copyright 'law and specific inclusion of computer programs in Copyright
Act).
3. See H.R. RaP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 5659, 5667 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (stating that computer
programs fall within Copyright Act's definition of literary works). Under the Copyright Act,
Congress classified computer programs as a form of literary work. Id. The Copyright Act
defines literary works as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers,
or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects ... in which they are embodied." Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 101. However, the
Copyright Act limits the copyright protection available to any copyrighted subject matter. See
id. § 102(b) (stating that copyright protection does not extend beyond certain boundaries).
According to section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, copyright protection for an original work
of authorship does not extend to "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id.
Courts also have held that computer game video displays are copyrightable as audiovisual
works. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that copyright protects audiovisual screens of computer video games); Atari v. North
Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982) (same); Atari v. Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981) (same).
4. See generally Synercom Technology v. University Computing, 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1012-13 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that copyright does not protect particular sequence of data
in computer program); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding that copyright protects computer program object code and source code), cert.
disnissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222,
1239 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that computer program copyright protection extends beyond
object code and source code to structure, sequence, and organization of code), cert denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Plains Cotton Co-op Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Service, 807 F.2d
1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (declining to embrace Whelan and holding that copyright does not protect
structure, sequence, and organization of computer program code), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821
(1987); Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(embracing Whelan and extending copyright protection to structure, sequence, and organization
of computer program audiovisual menu screens); Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib.
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scholars, 5 and industry participants6 has resulted from attempts to define
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 456 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (rejecting Broderbund extension of copyright
protection to computer screens and holding that copyright protects computer program screens
only when programmer obtains separate copyright registration on computer screens); Manu-
facturers Technologies v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984, 992-93 (D. Conn. 1989) (stating that
.copyright registration changes alter viability of Digital decision and holding that copyright
protection of computer program extends to computer program screens under legal fiction of
two copyright registrations, one for program code and one for program screens, existing in
single copyright registration on computer program); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990) (stating that copyright protection of computer
program extends to structure, sequence, and organization of computer program's menu
command structure).
5. See generally Nimmer and Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology Infringe-
ment: Defining Third Party Development Rights, 62 IND. L.J. 13 (1986) (stating that copyright
protection of computer programs must balance needs of original author and second, value-
added user and that certainty in balancing these needs in software infringement suits may be
impossible); Note, "Look and Feel" as A Copyrightable Element: The Legacy of Whelan v.
Jaslow?, 51 LA. L. REv. 177 (1990) (stating that once plaintiff establishes prima facie case in
copyright infringement suit, defendant should bear burden of proving that similarities between
programs are not due to any proscribed activity rather than plaintiff bearing burden of proving
copyrightability of similar computer program elements through strained abstractions analysis);
Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection
of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MicH. L. REv. 866 (1990) (stating that analysis
of copyright protection for computer program structure must include process or expression
distinction in addition to idea or expression distinction and merger doctrine); Note, Copyright
Protection for Computer Screen Displays, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1123 (1988) (stating that courts
should extend copyright protection to computer program screens but use heightened originality
standard, concrete, work-specific definition of screen's idea, and less grudging application of
merger doctrine); Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software,
38 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1986) (stating that courts judging similarities between two computer
screen displays should consider them as conventional audiovisual works, and courts judging
similarities in two computer program codes should consider structure of programs in addition
to individual lines of code); Note, Screen Displays are Proper Subject Matter for Copyright
Protection, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 757 (1988) (stating that Congress should review copyright
protection of computer screen displays and set explicit legislative guidelines to define scope of
copyright protection for computer screen displays); Note, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratories: Copyright Protection for Computer Software Structure - What's the Purpose?,
1987 Wis. L. REv. 859 (1987) (stating that copyright protection of computer programs will
result in duplication of logic development costs, adequate economic incentives already exist to
promote development of software, and courts should strictly limit holding in Whelan); Note,
The Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Exploring the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy, 43 WASH. & LE L. Rsv. 1373 (1986) (stating that federal judiciary should continue
to expand scope of copyright protection for computer programs to encompass programs' user
interface, structure, and organization, thereby promoting Congress' desire to foster creative
and intellectual achievements in computer programming through copyright laws); Comment,
A Rose By Any Other Name: Computer Programs and the Idea-Expression Distinction, 34
EMORY L.J. 741 (1985) (discussing importance of idea or expression distinction and suggesting
shortening life of copyright protection for computer programs while expanding scope of
copyright protection for computer programs); Comment, Softright: A Legislative Solution to
the Problem of Users' and Producers' Rights in Computer Software, 44 LA. L. Rv. 1413
(1984) (stating that software protection legislation can eliminate problems of software protection
and copying while furthering interests of developers and users); Comment, Copyright Protection
for Computer Software after Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 54 Mo. L. Rv.
121 (1989) (stating that settled issues of computer copyright protection include object code
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the scope of the Act's limited copyright protection for computer programs. 7
Nevertheless, by adopting a common framework to separate the protected
parts of a computer program from the unprotected parts, the courts can
eliminate much of this confusion and debate.
8
To appreciate the difficulty in determining the scope of copyright
protection for any given program, an understanding of how programmers
develop computer programs and how computers operate is necessary. A
programmer creates a computer program in stages that successively become
more detailed and specific.9 First, the programmer must identify and define
the objective that the program is to accomplish.' 0 As the definition process
progresses, the programmer collects information about the objective and
develops a general understanding of how to accomplish the objective." The
and source code, but unsettled issues of computer copyright protection include scope of
copyright protection and proper test for infringement claims); Comment, The Incompatibility
of Copyright and Computer Software: An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a
Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C.L. REv. 977 (1988) (stating that ad hoc copyright protection
for computer programs has produced more protection than is necessary to provide incentive
to create and recommending marketplace approach to software protection utilizing contract
law as foundation); Comment, Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc. - The Legal
Fiction Created by a Single Copyright Registration of a Computer Program and Its Display
Screens, 65 NoTRE DtA L. REv. 536 (1990) (stating that legal fiction approach to copyright
infringement suits is not proper framework for computer copyright analysis).
6. See Registration of Computer Screens is Subject of Copyright Office Hearing, Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 847, at 507 (Sept. 17, 1987) (discussing responses by
various industry participants to proposed changes in registration requirements for computer
programs). Apple Computer urged the Copyright Office to maintain separate copyright
registrations for a computer program and a computer program's audiovisual displays. Id. This
separation will clarify that the scope of copyright protection applicable to the literary work
embodied in the program code differs from the scope of copyright protection applicable to
the audiovisual work embodied in the screen displays. Id. Lotus Development urged the
Copyright Office to continue to offer only one copyright registration for each computer
program. Id. at 508. This single registration can encompass all of the copyrightable elements
contained in the program, and the single registration will provide the flexibility necessary for
software development. Id.
7. See infra notes 56-163 and accompanying text (describing court conclusions in
attempts to identify copyrightable elements of computer programs).
8. See infra notes 168-224 and accompanying text (proposing Lotus framework as
common framework for defining computer program protection under Copyright Act).
9. See Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. Rav. 1045, 1051 (1989) (stating that often programmers develop
programs in five stages: defining desired task; flowcharting; coding; debugging; preparing
documentation); Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1229 (3d Cir.
1986) (stating that creating program often takes several steps, moving from general steps to
specific steps), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
10. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1052 (stating that programmer first must identify user
tasks that program will accomplish). In defining the task that the program will accomplish, a
programmer must consider the needs and abilities of the end users and the particular limitations
and attributes of their work environment. Id. Therefore, a programmer must spend a consid-
erable amount of time in the design phase understanding the users of the program and
determining the best way to serve their needs. Id.; see also Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1229 (stating
that first step for programmer is identifying problem that program will solve).
11. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1052 (stating that programmer must understand users
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programmer then formulates this general understanding into a flowchart
that is composed of a logical series of steps describing how to accomplish
the objective.' 2 After completing the initial flowchart, the programmer
continues to subdivide each section of the flowchart into a series of smaller
tasks that become increasingly simple.13 In this manner a programmer
transforms a complex objective into a series of small tasks that operate
together to accomplish the overall objective.'
4
The process of flowcharting and reducing the objective to a series of
smaller tasks is not an exact science.' 5 The identification and arrangement
of these smaller tasks control the overall operation of the program, including
how the program communicates with the end user, receives data from the
end user, and manipulates the data to achieve a result.' 6 How effectively
the program accomplishes each of these tasks depends on the expectations
of the end user and the knowledge and talent of the programmer. 7
and their needs). During a program's design phase, a programmer usually researches the nature
of the task that the program will accomplish as well as the backgrounds and abilities of the
users and the attributes of the users' work environment. Id. The computer industry refers to
this process as the study of human factors and defines this study as the field of computer-
human interaction. Id. at 1053. Although relatively new, the field of computer-human inter-
action has impacted greatly on the development of application programs. Id. The main impact
has been in the way that a programmer both conceptualizes and writes an application program.
Id. As a programmer conceptualizes and writes a program, a programmer strives to incorporate
the following five human factor goals into the program's design: minimize the user's learning
time; maximize the user's speed of performance; minimize the user's rate of errors; maximize
the user's satisfaction; maximize the user's retention of knowledge over time. Id. at 1053-54;
see generally Curtis, Engineering Computer "Look and Feel": User Interface Technology and
Human Factors Engineering, 30 JuRnMeTRucs J. 51 (1989) (discussing history of user interface
design and impact of human factors engineering on user interface design).
12. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230 (stating that programmer usually outlines solution in
flowchart form as programmer learns more about problem).
13. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1055 (stating that most common form of flowcharting
is top down approach). The top down approach facilitates the conversion of large, complex
problems into smaller, less complex problems. Id. Utilizing the top down approach, the.
programmer breaks down each task into a series of modules or subroutines, and then, the
programmer breaks the subroutines down into individual component parts. Id. This process
continues until the programmer can translate the components of the flowchart into a program-
ming language. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230 (stating that programmer has numerous ways to solve
data organization problems that may arise). Each solution to define data organization problems
may have particular characteristics that make it more or less desirable from the perspective of
the overall program. Id.
16. See id. (stating that as programmer refines program structure, programmer must
decide what data program needs, when user inputs data, how user inputs data, and how
program combines data with other data).
17. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1056 (stating that although some programmers have
distinctive programming styles, common goal is to produce program that is accurate, efficient,
and reliable). Several factors comprise the concept of computer program efficiency: code
efficiency, which is maximizing the program's processing speed; memory efficiency, which is
minimizing the amount of computer memory necessary to perform the desired tasks; input/
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After defining the program structure, the programmer, [by coding the
program] converts the program structure into a form that the computer can
understand. This conversion has two possible forms. 9 The first form,
known as object code, is the only code that a computer can execute directly.
20
Because writing programs in object code is very cumbersome, most pro-
grammers write programs in a second code form known as source code.
21
A source code is a computer "language" that has specific commands and
syntax, but a source code permits programmers to write commands in a
simpler format.? The computer has the capability, through the use of a
compiler or an interpreter, to convert the source code into an object code
and then execute the instructions .2  After completing the coding, the pro-
grammer runs the program to detect and to correct any errors.24 After
correcting the errors, the programmer's only remaining duties are docu-
menting how to operate the program and performing any maintenance that
the program may require?
The actual coding is a relatively small part of the overall computer
program development process.2 6 Typically, only twenty percent of a pro-
gram's development costs are for coding.27 The remaining eighty percent of
output efficiency, which is maximizing the quality and speed of information transmission
between the computer and the user. Id. at 1052-54.
18. See Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1230 (3d Cir. 1986)
(stating that after programmer completes design of program, programmer converts subroutines
into language computer can understand), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
19. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Mass.
1990) (describing object code and source code as two coding forms that represent literal or
written manifestation of computer program).
20. See id. at 44 (stating that object code is language which computer can execute directly
without translation).
21. See id. (noting that object code rarely is written directly by computer programmers).
22. See id. (stating that source code is computer program written in some programming
language, such as FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslation), COBOL (COmmon Business Oriented
Language), Pascal, or BASIC, that uses complex symbolic names, along with complex rules
of syntax). The Lotus court compared object code and source code through the following
task: "divide the value of 'B' by the value of 'C' and add the result to the value of 'A.2"
Id. A programmer writing in object code might accomplish this task as follows: 0010000000010001;
1000000011010010; 1101000000010000. Id. However, a programmer writing in source code
might accomplish the same task as A + B/C. Id.
23. See id. (stating that either compiler translates entire program before computer executes
program or interpreter translates each program line simultaneously as program executes line).
24. See Menell, supra note 9, at 1051 (stating that fourth stage of computer program
development involves testing program for accuracy, correcting programming errors, and veri-
fying that program functions properly).
25. See Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986)
(stating that documentation and maintenance are important in creating computer programs),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
26. See id. (stating that larger portion of expense and difficulty in creating computer
programs is attributable to development of structure and logic of program, rather than to
coding). The development of the structure and logic of a computer program includes debugging,
documentation, and maintenance. Id.
27. See id. (noting that only 20% of program development cost goes into encoding).
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the development costs are for the design of the program. 2 In addition to
representing most of the development costs, the design of the program also
determines the commercial success or failure of the program because the
end user judges a computer program on the strength of its design and
operation. 29 Therefore, the design is the most important and valuable part
of a program to a computer program developer.30
Consequently, the design is the portion of the program that a program-
mer wants to protect through copyright. However, doubt remains as to
whether the scope of copyright protection extends this far. The scope of
copyright protection for a given copyrighted work is only at issue when the
owner of the copyright registration claims an infringement."' In an infringe-
ment suit, the copyright holder must establish ownership of a valid copyright
on the allegedly infringed work.3 2 After establishing ownership of a valid
copyright, the copyright holder must prove that the allegedly infringing
work is a copy of the copyrighted work.33 Ownership of a copyright
registration is prima facie evidence of a valid copyright,34 but ownership
merely raises a rebuttable presumption.3 5 The owner of the allegedly infring-
ing work can rebut this presumption by proving that copyright law does
not protect the portions of the copyrighted work allegedly infringed.
6
28. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text (describing most cost intensive steps in
developing computer program).
29. See Curtis, supra note 11, at 52-53 (describing importance of computer program's
user interface design to commercial success of program). The design of the computer program's
user interface is crucial in marketing the program to end users. Id. End users quickly judge a
program's ease of use and learning through the program's user interface. Id. A superior user
interface can differentiate a computer program from competing computer programs. Id.
30. See id. (stating that user interface has become paramount concern in designing
computer programs).
31. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing elements of copyright
infringement suit); L. KurrTENr, supra note 2, §§ 2.071]-[5] (discussing copyright elements,
defenses, and remedies of copyright infringement suits).
32. See Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that to prove claim of copyright infringement, copyright holder bears burden of
proving ownership of valid copyright), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
33. See id. (holding that copyright owner must prove that allegedly infringing work is
copy of copyrighted work).
34. See Copyright Act, supra note I, § 410 (describing issuance and effect of valid
copyright registration). The Register of Copyrights will register a claim and issue a certificate
of registration under the seal of the Copyright Office after examining the material presented
for copyright registration, determining that the material constitutes copyrightable subject matter,
and ensuring that the applicant has fulfilled all remaining legal and formal requirements of
the Copyright Act. Id. A certificate of registration, issued prior to or within five years of the
first publication of the registered work, constitutes prima facie evidence in any judicial
proceeding that the copyright and the facts stated in the certificate are valid. Id.
35. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing how defendant can rebut
presumption raised by ownership of valid copyright registration).
36. See Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 456
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (holding that where copyright owner has proven validity of copyright
registration, owner of allegedly infringing computer program bears burden of producing
evidence that brings into question copyrightability of original program).
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The debate over what portion of a literary work copyright law protects
and what portion of a literary work copyright law does not protect usually
centers on the distinction between an idea and its expression.3 7 Copyright
law does not protect an idea but does protect the expression of an idea
within certain limits.3 8 First, the expression must be original. 39 Second, the
expression must be separable from the idea and not essential to the idea.
4
0
Third, even if the expression is not essential to the idea, copyright law will
not protect the expression if the expression is one of but a limited number
37. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 53 (D. Mass.
1990) (stating that idea or expression distinction has long been fundamental part of copyright
law).
38. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (holding that copyright law does not
protect ideas, but only expressions of ideas). In Baker, Selden owned copyright registrations
on a series of books that described a peculiar system of double entry bookkeeping. Id. at 99-
100. The books contained several blank forms, consisting of ruled lines and headings, that
illustrated the system and were essential to the use of the system. Id. at 100. Baker subsequently
published a book that described the system developed by Selden and employed similar blank
forms. Id. In the ensuing copyright infringement suit, Selden contended that his copyright
registration entitled him to the exclusive use of the forms contained in the book, and any use
of similar forms in a subsequent work violated the copyright. Id. at 101. In addressing this
contention, the Supreme Court stated that a clear distinction exists between a book and the
art that the book illustrates. Id. at 102. A copyright registration on a book protects the
author's particular explanation of the art described in the book, but the copyright registration
does not automatically give the author the exclusive right to use the art described in the book.
Id. If the forms in a book, or forms similar to them, are necessary to the performance of the
art described in the book, then the forms are necessary incidents to the art. Id. at 103. Such
necessary incidents are in the public domain, and a copyright registration does not entitle the
author to the exclusive use of such necessary incidents. Id.
In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court expanded the principle espoused in Baker v. Selden.
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding that copyright protects only expression
of idea, not idea itself). Stein created and sold lamps with statuettes as lampbases. Id. at 203.
Stein owned a copyright registration on the statuettes, and Mazer, without authorization,
copied the statuettes and began selling lamps with the statuettes as lampbases. Id. at 202-03.
In the ensuing copyright infringement suit, the Supreme Court held that the copyright
registration did not give Stein the exclusive right to use any statuettes as lampbases. Id. at
217. However, the copyright registration did give Stein the exclusive right to use the registered
statuettes as lampbases, and Stein could use the copyright registration to prevent others from
making lamps that incorporated copies of the registered statuettes. Id.
Congress incorporated the distinction between idea and expression into the Copyright
Act. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5670 (stating that § 102(b) of the Copyright Act
specifically precludes copyright protection from any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery). Copyright does not grant an author exclusive
use of ideas or information contained in the author's work. Id.
39. See Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 102(a) (stating that copyright protection subsists
in original works of authorship); see also Housa REPORT, supra note 3, at 5664 (stating that
originality and fixation in tangible form are two fundamental criteria of copyright protection).
Congress purposely left the definition of the standard "original works of authorship" to the
courts, but Congress specifically stated that the standard did not require novelty, ingenuity,
or aesthetic merit. Id.; see also Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 48 (stating that original refers to works
independently created by author).
40. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 52 (stating that elements of useful article that can exist
independently of utilitarian aspects of article are copyrightable as elements of expression).
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of possible expressions. 4' The reason for these limitations is that the primary
goal of copyright protection is to benefit the public, and Congress' decision
to reward authors with copyright monopolies is only a means to this end.
42 Society benefits if authors generate new ideas and disclose these ideas to
the public. 43 Copyright law provides encouragement by protecting an au-
thor's work, but the protection cannot be so broad as to be detrimental to
the public. 4 The Copyright Act attempts to balance these goals by refusing
41. See id. at 59 (discussing concept of merger and lack of copyright protection for
expressions that are limited in number). If specific expression is one of a limited number of
ways of expressing an idea, the expression is not copyrightable. Id. Otherwise, copyright
protection easily would permit an author or authors to control an idea that has a limited
number of expressions by copyrighting all of the possible expressions. Id.
In Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
espoused the basic principle underlying the concept of merger. 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.
1967). The Morrissey court stated:
[w]hen the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the 'topic
necessarily requires,' if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited
number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting
a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.
In such circumstances it does not seem accurate to say that any particular form of
expression comes from the subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the
subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression.
We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be
checkmated.
Id.
In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit espoused a classic application of the merger doctrine. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1971). In Kalpakian the court held that copyright did not protect the idea of a jewel-encrusted
bee pin. Id. at 742. Any manufacturer could only design a jewel-encrusted bee pin in a limited
number of ways; thus, the idea of a jewel-encrusted bee pin merges with the expression of a
jewel-encrusted bee pin because the expression cannot be separated from the idea. Id. If the
court permitted copyright protection for the pin, the manufacturer that held the copyright
registration would have a monopoly on the jewel-encrusted bee pin market because no other
manufacturer could create a substantially different jewel-encrusted bee pin. Id.
42. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D. Mass.
1990) (noting that Congress grants copyright monopolies for purpose of promoting public
welfare). Congress grants copyright monopolies to serve the public welfare by encouraging
authors to generate new ideas and disclose these ideas to the public in any uniquely expressed
way. Id.
43. See id. (stating that encouraging individual effort by personal gain is best way to
advance public welfare); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating that economic
philosophy behind constitutional clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights
is conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is best way to advance
public welfare through talent of authors and inventors).
44. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 52 (stating that competing goals of copyright protection
are advancement of public welfare and reward of individual authors). Balancing the competing
goals of copyright protection is a delicate task. Id.; see also Menell, supra note 9, at 1047
(stating that establishing a precise line between copyrightable expression of computer programs
and noncopyrightable processes of computer programs is impossible). If courts construe
copyright protection for computer programs too broadly then courts will grant strong monop-
olies to the initial authors of a program and will prohibit other authors from developing
improved products. Id. at 1047-48. If courts construe copyright protection for computer
1086
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to draw a bright line distinction between ideas and expression and leaving
this determination to the courts.
45
As the use of computers has proliferated, the creation of computer
programs has become an extremely large and lucrative business.4 6 Identifying
needs for computer programs and fulfilling those needs has produced great
financial rewards and fostered great leaps in technological innovation. 47 The
rapid innovation in computers and computer programming also has per-
mitted many individual programmers successfully to develop and to market
programs, and the programming industry has not become totally dominated
by a few large manufacturers. 41 Success, however, has its price, and because
of increased program copying, many problems have developed in the com-
puter programming industry.49 This copying in turn has generated the
increasing number of lawsuits that have disputed the scope of copyright
protection for computer programs. 0
Early case law established that copyright protection of a computer
program extends to its object code and source code, and consequently,
copyright law now firmly protects these "literal elements." 5' Copyright
programs too narrowly then courts will allow other authors to copy an initial author's work
easily and will discourage all but modest innovation. Id. at 1048.
45. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 53 (stating that Congress has refused to draw boundary
line between copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements of computer programs). Congress
has mandated that courts determine the boundary line between copyrightable and noncopy-
rightable expression by using an evaluative standard that balances the competing goals of
copyright protection. Id.
46. See A. CLAPES, SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT, & COMPETITION 20 (1989) (stating that
software industry in United States is burgeoning). In recent years the software industry has
experienced an annualized revenue growth rate in excess of 30Vo, and revenues have approached
$8 billion dollars annually. Id. Customers worldwide range from governments and corporations
to individuals using personal home computers, and industry participants range from large
corporations to individuals composing programs on personal home computers. Id. at 19.
47. See id. at 20 (stating that art of writing programs has fostered vital and valuable
market both in economic benefits and social benefits). Commonly, the social benefits and
economic efficiencies derived from high quality computer programs exceeds the pure financial
rewards that a developer receives. Id. Computer programs are now at the heart of such
everyday activities as the air traffic control system, the bank clearing system, and the payroll
system. Id.
48. See id. at 22 (discussing attributes of software industry and effect on program
development). The prominent attributes of the software industry include: low capital require-
ments, high reliance on skilled intellectual labor, great variability in the skill levels of
participants active in industry, and a shortage of extremely good program writers. Id. The
low capital requirements produce extensive competition because skilled individuals can enter
the market with few economic contributions other than their time and energy. Id. A result is
that a single author or a small group of authors can produce extraordinarily successful
programs, and the market has witnessed one time garage shop programmers become major
players in the industry. Id.
49. See The Economist, July 7, 1990, at 69, col. 3 (noting that cheap look-alike versions
of well known programs are common).
50. See supra note 4 (listing series of cases that deal with issue of copyright protection
for computer programs).
51. See Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1983)
(protecting both source and object code), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 48:1079
protection beyond a computer program's literal elements, however, has been
highly contested, and the resulting court decisions have produced little
accord and much confusion. 52 The "nonliteral" elements of a computer
program are those elements of a computer program other than the object
code and the source code. 53 The nonliteral elements include the "structure,
sequence, and organization" of the source code and the object code, the
structure of the "user interface" that permits the user to communicate both
data and commands to the program, and the presentation of information
on the screen.5 4 These elements basically encompass those portions of the
program that the design phase produces.55 The continuing debate and
confusion over copyright protection of a computer program's nonliteral
elements presents a very important dilemma for programmers and manu-
facturers alike: copyright law may or may not protect the most substantial
part of a computer program investment, the design of the program.
One of the first courts to address the copyrightability of a computer
program's nonliteral elements was the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory.16 The Whelan court ad-
dressed whether the scope of copyright protection extended to a computer
program's structure, sequence, and organization or extended only to a
computer program's literal code. 57 In addressing this issue the court recog-
nized that the first step was to determine if the structure, sequence, and
organization of the computer program represented copyrightable material.
The court sought to develop a test that would both facilitate the distinction
between idea and expression in computer programs and force a court to
balance the competing goals of the copyright law.5 9 In developing this test,
the court initially classified the computer program in question as a utilitarian
52. See infra notes 56-163 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches and
results of several courts).
53. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass.
1990) (stating that nonliteral elements differ from program's written code).
54. See id. (stating that nonliteral elements include overall organization of program,
structure of program's command system, and presentation of information on screen).
55. See supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text (describing development of computer
programs).
56. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
57. Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1224 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). The copyrightability of the structure, sequence, and
organization of a computer program was a question of first impression for the Third Circuit
in Whelan. Id. In addressing the question of copyrightability the Whelan court stated that the
court first must determine whether copyright protection extends beyond a program's literal
code. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1235. The Whelan court stated that distinguishing the expression of an idea
from the idea itself is often difficult. Id. However, the Whelan court sought to formulate a
rule to facilitate the distinction between expression and idea in the context of computer
programs by reviewing relevant copyright precedents. Id.
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work rather than a fictional or artistic work.6 Then, relying on Baker v.
Selden,6 1 the court stated that the idea of a utilitarian work is the purpose
or function of the work, and, thus, the first step in the test is to determine
the purpose or function of the work.62 Next, the court stated that the
expression of the idea is everything that is not necessary to the purpose or
function of the work, and, thus, the second step of the test is to determine
the aspects of the work that are not necessary to the purpose or function
of the work.63 In determining what is expression under the second step of
the test, the court stated that if numerous ways of achieving the desired
purpose or function exist, then the specific way chosen is not necessary to
the purpose or function and, thus, is protectible expression rather than
unprotectible idea.6
The Whelan court further held that its test does not violate the mandates
of the Copyright Act . 6 First, because a court must determine that numerous
ways of achieving the desired purpose or function exist, the test does not
permit protection of expressions that are limited in number.66 Second, the
test properly balances the ideals of copyright law because the test affords
protection to a programmer's most valuable efforts while not retarding the
development of new programs that accomplish the same task in a different
manner.67
In applying their test, the Whelan court held that the idea of the
allegedly infringed program was to improve the efficiency of the business
operations of a dental office.68 The court then held that the expression of
this idea was the manner in which the programmer structured the program
to operate and control the computer in receiving, manipulating, and pro-
ducing useful information.6 9 Having separated the program's idea from the
program's expression, the court determined that the expression embodied
in the program structure was not essential to the idea of the program
60. Id. at 1238. The Whelan court held that the rule which the Whelan court developed
functions best in the analysis of utilitarian works. Id.
61. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
62. Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). The Whelan court held that a court may draw the line
between a program's idea and the program's expression of the idea by focusing on the end
that the program seeks to achieve. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1237. The Whelan court held that their test would advance the basic purpose
underlying the idea or expression distinction by preserving the balance between competition
and protection. Id.
66. Id. at 1236. In determining whether or not an expression is necessary to the
achievement of a desired purpose, the Whelan court stated that only if several methods of
achieving a desired purpose exist can a court determine that any one method is not necessary
to achieving the desired purpose. Id.
67. Id. at 1237.
68. Id. at 1238.
69. Id. at 1239.
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because other programs existed that accomplished the same task but had
different program structures.7 0 Based on these conclusions, the court ex-
tended copyright protection beyond a program's literal elements to the
nonliteral elements of structure, sequence, and organization. 7'
A second court to address the protection of a computer program's
nonliteral elements was the District Court for the Northern District of
California in Broderbund Software v. Unison World.7 2 The Broderbund
court addressed whether the copyright protection of a computer program
extends to the program's audiovisual displays, or more specifically, the
menu screens, the input formats, and the sequencing of screens. 73 The court
considered the idea or expression distinction as the threshold issue, but the
court did not utilize the Whelan test.
74
The first element of the idea or expression distinction that the court
explored was the idea of merger. 71 Under the merger doctrine copyright law
will not protect an expression that is indistinguishable from the idea that
the expression represents; the expression "merges" with the idea.76 Though
expressed in a slightly different way, the merger doctrine is analogous to
the Whelan court's statement that an expression is copyrightable only if the
expression is but one way of numerous ways to express the idea. 77 From
this brief analysis the court proceeded to address whether the menu screens,
the input formats, and the screen sequencing in the program at issue were
expressions that were indistinguishable from the underlying idea that they
were expressing. 78 The court concluded that these audiovisual elements were
distinguishable expression because of the existence of one other program
on the market that accomplished the same task in a different manner. 79
This one program satisfied the court that many different ways of expressing
the ideas embodied in the allegedly infringed program existed.80
70. Id. at 1240.
71. Id. at 1248.
72. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
73. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1131-32 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
74. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (explaining Broderbund court's con-
densation of Whelan test).
75. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1131.
76. Id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing concept of merger
doctrine and corresponding prohibition of copyright protection for expressions of an idea that
are limited in number).
77. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (explaining that number of expressions
must be numerous to extend copyright protection to any one expression).
78. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(addressing defendant's argument that any menu driven program enabling users to create cards,
banners, and posters will have substantially same user interface).
79. Id. Plaintiffs produced "Stickybear Printer" as evidence of a competing program
that accomplished substantially the same functions in a very different manner. Id.




To support the extension of copyright protection to a program's au-
diovisual displays, the court relied on an interpretation of Whelan.8' The
court interpreted Whelan to stand for the extension of copyright protection
beyond a program's literal aspects to the overall structure of a program,
including the program's audiovisual displays. 82 This interpretation of Whe-
Ian, however, is overexpansive because the Whelan court did not address
the copyrightability of audiovisual screens.8 3 The Whelan court only ad-
dressed the copyrightability of the structure, sequence, and organization of
the program code, and the Whelan court merely deemed the screen displays
to have some probative value as evidence of alleged copying.
4
Under the Whelan test, audiovisual screen displays would receive cop-
yright protection only if they were not necessary to the underlying function
of the program and were expressible in numerous ways.8 5 However, the
Broderbund court condensed the Whelan two part test into a single test by
analyzing function and expression collectively rather than separately. 6 Under
the Broderbund analysis, if the audiovisual displays are expressible in a
number of different ways then logically they are not essential to the purpose
or function of the underlying program. 7 This approach clouds the distinction
between idea and expression and can produce confusing and erroneous
results because this approach focuses the fact-finder's attention on the
expression of the idea before the fact-finder formulates the idea.8
81. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
82. Id.
83. See Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Screen Displays, 72 MiNN. L. REv.
1123, 1145 (1988) (explaining that Whelan court never suggested that program's copyright
extended beyond program code-to embrace screen displays). The Broderbund court's extension
of copyright protection to the structure, sequence, and organization of program's screen
displays is without precedent because the Broderbund court misinterpreted Whelan. Id.; see
also Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga.
1987) (holding that Broderbund court's reading of Whelan was overexpansive and erroneous).
84. See Note, supra note 83, at 1145 (stating that Whelan court dismissed screen displays
as only minimally relevant to proving program infringement because entirely different program
codes can produce similar screens).
85. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (explaining test for distinguishing
protectible expression from unprotectible idea).
86. See Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (N.D. Ca.
1986) (addressing only whether program's ideas are expressible in numerous different ways
rather than separating analysis into purpose or function of program and whether or not chosen
expression is essential to program's purpose or function).
87. See id. at 1134 (holding that artistic and aesthetic considerations and not utilitarian
considerations dictated structure, sequence, and layout of audiovisual displays in allegedly
infringed program).
88. See id. at 1132 (holding that existence of one other program on market proved that
numerous ways existed to express underlying idea embodied in both programs). By beginning
with the expression rather than the idea underlying the expression, the Broderbund court failed
to address the concept of merger. Id.; see also supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text
(defining Broderbund court's concept of merger).
The existence of one other program does not sufficiently prove that there are numerous
ways to express an idea. See supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text (discussing development
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Subsequently, in Digital Communications v. Softklone Distributing9 a
court again addressed the issue of copyright protection for a computer
program's audiovisual screens2 ° The Digital court recognized Whelan as the
leading case extending copyright protection beyond a computer program's
source code and object code, but the court refused to embrace the Brod-
erbund expansion of Whelan.9' In rejecting the Broderbund holding that
copyright protection of a computer program extended to the program's
audiovisual displays, the court held that copyright protection of a computer
program's screen displays must extend from a source other than the copy-
right registration on the computer program.92 However, the court noted that
the computer screens in question had a separate audiovisual copyright
registration, and the court held that a valid copyright registration for a
computer program's screen displays provides a basis for copyright protection
of the screen displays. 93
Consequently, the court turned to the idea or expression distinction to
determine if the particular status screen at issue was copyrightable. 94 The
court did not expressly follow the Whelan test, but did utilize a similar
approach. 95 First, the court defined the idea behind a status screen.9 6 The
court determined that the idea behind a status screen is the process or
manner by which a status screen operates.97 Having defined the idea, the
court next addressed the expression of a status screen. 9 The court determined
that the expression of a status screen is the method by which a status screen
communicates the idea to the user.99
of computer programs and importance of satisfying needs of users to commercial success
computer programs). In fact, the existence of only one other program on the market strongly
indicates that only a limited number of ways exist to express the idea embodied in the programs
at issue. Id.
89. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
90. See Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 453
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (noting that defendants contest copyrightability of computer program's status
screen as audiovisual display).
91. See id. at 455 (interpreting Whelan as not specifically extending copyright protection
to computer program's screen displays). The Digital court held that the Broderbund court's
reading of Whelan was overexpansive and erroneous. Id.
92. Id. at 456.
93. Id. The Digital court stated that a certificate of copyright registration represents
prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright on the registered work and raises a
presumption of copyrightability of the work's subject matter. Id. However, the defendant may
rebut the presumption of copyrightability by introducing evidence that the work's subject
matter is not copyrightable. Id.
94. Id. at 457.
95. Id. at 458. In applying the idea or expression distinction, the Digital court realized
that the inherent problem is defining the underlying idea of the copyrighted work. Id. Once
the court conceptualizes the idea, however, then the court can determine whether or not there







Having defined the separate idea and expression embodied in a status
screen, the court held that certain elements of the status screen were ideas
that could not be copyrighted because they only related to how the user
conveys commands to the program and how the program conveys the results
of those commands to the user.'00 According to the court, the noncopyright-
able elements included the following: the use of the status screen to convey
information, the use of a menu command system to operate the program,
and the particular method in which the user conveyed the commands to the
computer. 01 The court, however, distinguished the presentation of these
ideas on the screen as expression entitled to copyright protection because
the presentation of the information was unrelated to the operation of the
program. 0 2 The court identified the arrangement of the command terms
and the specific highlighting of the command terms as copyrightable elements
of expression. 03 Finally, the Digital court held that the expression of the
status screen did not merge with its underlying idea because the author
could arrange the status screen in a variety of ways.
1°4
In 1987, a ruling by the Copyright Office cast doubt over the Digital
court's basic holding that copyright law only protected a computer program's
audiovisual screens that an author registered under a separate audiovisual
copyright. 05 The Copyright Office, after notice and hearing, issued new
guidelines for registering computer programs that limited the number of
separate copyright registrations to one per program.lc 6 Depending on whether
the predominant screen displays of the program were pictorial or textual, a
programmer could obtain either an audiovisual copyright or a program
copyright, but a programmer could not obtain both copyrights for the same
program." 7 An audiovisual copyright would protect the underlying computer
program, and a program copyright would protect the textual screen displays
generated by the program.
0 8
100. Id. at 459.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Digital court did place one limitation on the copyrightability of a status
screen's expression. Id. at 460-61. If the status screen merely indicates where to record data,
then the status screen is a blank form that copyright law does not protect. Id. at 461 (noting
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)). If, however, the arrangement of the status screen is
sufficiently innovative so that the status screen actually conveys information to the user, then
copyright law should protect the status screen. Id.
104. Id. at 460.
105. See Registration Decision, 53 Fed. Reg. 21817, 21818 (1988) (indicating concern that
Digital decision would cast doubt on copyright protection of computer screen displays where
author failed to obtain separate registration on screen displays).
106. See id. at 21817 (informing public that Copyright Office considers as one work all
copyrightable expression owned by same claimant and embodied in computer program, in-
cluding computer screen displays, and requires registration on single application form).
107. See id. at 21818 (indicating existence of two different copyright registrations). If the
authorship of the computer program is predominately literary, then the registrant should use
form TX. Id. If the authorship of the computer program is predominately audiovisual, then
the registrant should use form PA. Id.
108. See id. (indicating that single registration covers all copyrightable elements embodied
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However, decisions by the Copyright Office, though controlling over
the registration process, are not binding authority on courts.' 9 Therefore,
under the Copyright Office's new single copyright registration policy, a
programmer who obtains a program copyright registration may not receive
any protection for the program's screen displays." 0 Accordingly, a court
that chooses to follow the Digital opinion will not extend the copyright
protection of the underlying program to the program's screen displays."'
Shortly after the Copyright Office's ruling, the Connecticut District
Court addressed the issue of copyright protection of a computer program
extending to the program's screen displays in Manufacturers Technologies
v. Cams."2 In Cams the district court refused to follow the Broderbund
decision because the Broderbund decision overextended copyright protection
by ignoring that more than one program can generate the same screen
display." 3 The Cams court approved of the Digital court's decision not to
extend the copyright protection of a computer program beyond that estab-
lished in Whelan while upholding the validity of a second copyright on a
program's screen displays." 4 Realizing that the Digital decision and the
Copyright Office ruling were at odds, the court created the legal fiction of
two separate, but interrelated copyright registrations derived from the single
copyright registration permitted by the Copyright Office." 5 Under this legal
fiction, copyright protection extended to both the program and its screen
displays to the extent that each contained copyrightable material."
6
in work). The Copyright Office stated that a registrant should give a description on the
application as either "entire work" or "computer program." Id. at 21819. This description
would cover the program's code and screen displays regardless of whether or not the registrant
deposited material identifying the program's screen displays with the Copyright Office. Id. If
the registrant, however, refers to specific screen displays in the description of the work on the
registration form, the registrant must deposit material that visually identifies the screen displays.
Id. at 21820.
109. See Note, supra note 83, at 1150 (explaining that in jurisdiction following Digital
precedent, developer that is unable to register screen displays separately has no legal recourse
against competitor that utilizes developer's screen displays but produces them with different
computer program code).
110. See id. at 1143 (stating that disallowing simultaneous but separate registration of
screen displays places developers desiring to protect their screen displays at mercy of courts
following Digital precedent).
11I. See supra notes 89-108 and accompanying text (explaining Digital court's rationale
and effect of Copyright Office ruling).
112. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
113. See Manufacturers Technologies v. Cams, 706 F. Supp. 984, 992-93 (D. Conn. 1989)
(explaining that Broderbund approach ignores fact that more than one computer program can
produce virtually identical screen displays).
114. See id. at 993 (stating that computer program and computer-program's screen displays
are fundamentally distinct). By refusing to extend copyright protection of the underlying
program to the program's screen displays, courts can focus on the unique copyrightable
elements in each and avoid the mistake of confusing the underlying idea of the program with
the underlying idea of a particular screen display. Id.
115. Id. The Cams court held that the legal fiction of two separate copyrights derived
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Having established the legal fiction framework, the Cams court pro-
ceeded with the idea or expression distinction adopted by the Digital court.
1 1 7
The court, however, faced a different situation than the Digital court because
a sequence of screen displays was at issue instead of a single status screen.11 8
To compensate for this difference, the court divided the screen displays into
external and internal aspects." 9 The court deemed the sequence and flow
of the screen displays to be the external aspects of the screen displays.'
20
The court then classified the placement of the screen heading, the program
commands, and the chosen function or selection on each individual screen
as the internal aspects of the screen displays.' 2'
Consequently, the court held that the external aspects of the program
in question were copyrightable because they represented the expression of
the programmer's idea of how to best accomplish the process of making a
cost estimate.12 According to expert testimony, the process functionally
does not limit expression because each individual creating a cost estimate
often uses a specific process unique to that individual. 23 As for the internal
aspects of the screen displays, the court held that some aspects were
copyrightable and others were not copyrightable. 24 For example, the format
of the screens was not copyrightable because the size of the screen physically
limited the placement of command menus and status lines to a narrow
range of possibilities.125 Also not copyrightable because of the limited choices
available were the method of navigation within each screen and the menu
driven navigation between successive screens. 2 6 The court, however, did
from a single copyright registration would permit courts to give copyright protection to the
copyrightable elements in both the program and the program's screen displays while conforming
to the registration policies of the Copyright Office. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 994 (stating that idea of program was process of creating cost estimate).
118. See id. at 993-94 (indicating that programmer registered screen displays in question
as "compilations" under § 101 of Copyright Act). Because the programmer registered the
works as "compilations," the Cams court held that the trial court must perform a bifurcated
analysis of the external aspects and internal aspects of the screen displays. Id. at 994.
119. Id. at 994.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 994-95.
122. See id. at 994 (stating that making cost estimate was primary function of program).
The programmer in Cams designed the program in question to enable the user to estimate the
cost of machining a manufactured part without having to perform manual calculations. Id. at
988. Making a cost estimate involves synthesizing information concerning selection of materials,
assignment of material costs, selection of number of operations, selection of type of operations,
and assignment of engineering costs, sales costs, and handling costs. Id.
123. See id. (explaining that cost estimate process is unique to each individual). Each
individual will usually prioritize, select, and arrange the operations to be performed in a
different way. Id.
124. See id. at 995-98 (describing internal elements that are copyrightable and internal
elements that are not copyrightable).
125. Id. at 995. The physical size of the screen limits the placement of components on
the screen to some type of vertical or horizontal configuration. Id.
126. Id. at 995-96.
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hold that the composition of the status screen, the arrangement of the
specific terms within the menus, the assignment of certain terms to certain
operations, and the construction of a status report represented copyrightable
expression.
27
The most recent case involving copyright protection of computer pro-
grams is Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International.2 8
The key issue in Lotus was whether the nonliteral elements of a computer
program are copyrightable, and if they are copyrightable, how a court could
distinguish these nonliteral elements from those nonliteral elements that are
not copyrightable. 2 9 To answer this question, the Lotus court first examined
the Copyright Act and the Act's underlying object and policy to determine
how best to draw the line between the copyrightable and the noncopyright-
able elements of a computer program. 30 The court concluded that the idea
or expression distinction remained the best vehicle for this determination
because the distinction forces courts to weigh the competing goals of the
copyright law in making a decision.' 3 ' Drawing the line between the literal
and nonliteral elements of a computer program was too restrictive and,
furthermore, did not permit the courts properly to consider the goal of
copyright law to encourage creativity and to make ideas available for public
benefit by granting authors a limited monopoly.
32
To address properly the idea or expression distinction the court consid-
ered four critical concepts: originality, functionality, obviousness, and
merger. 33 First, the court stated that an expression is copyrightable only if
the expression is original and only if the expression does not embody
elements of the idea that are functional in the utilitarian sense.'3 4 Second,
the court stated that if an expression is obvious or is expressible in only a
limited number of ways, then copyright protection does not extend to the
expression because the expression merges with the idea and is inseparable
from the idea itself. 35 Consequently, recognizing that no established legal
test existed that encompassed these concepts in a factual situation involving
a computer program copyright, the court created a three pronged legal test
to govern issues of computer program copyright protection.
36
127. Id. at 996.
128. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
129. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Mass.
1990) (describing amorphous nature of nonliteral elements of computer program).
130. See id. 47-53 (detailing Congressional mandates embodied in Copyright Act and
relevant judicial interpretations of Copyright Act).
131. See id. at 54 (concluding that Congress manifested intention to use idea or expression
distinction as part of test of copyrightability for computer programs).
132. See id. (concluding that idea or expression distinction is consistent with object and
policies of copyright).
133. Id. at 58-59.
134. Id. at 58.
135. Id. at 58-59. The Lotus court stated that the concept of merger was only a slight
extension of the "obviousness" doctrine. Id. at 59. The difference is that under the merger
doctrine the expression is separable from the idea, but the available expressions are limited in
number. Id.
136. See id. at 59 (stating that no copyright statute or previous copyright cases adequately
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Under the Lotus court's legal test a court first must make some
formulation or conception to define the idea of the program in question.
3 7
This formulation must be done on a linear scale that runs from a generalized
conception of the idea to a more particularized conception of the idea. 3
Although a bright line rule to follow in developing these formulations is
nonexistent, attempting to define the idea represented by the computer
program from a general level to a more specific level will provide the court
with a good starting point. 3 9 Once the court is satisfied that the formulation
of the program's idea is sufficient, the second step is to analyze the
program's expression of the idea.Y° Specifically, the court must determine
if the expression is limited to elements essential to the expression of the
idea or, alternatively, if the expression is one of only a limited number of
ways to express the idea."4 Finally, if the court determines that elements
are present which are not essential to every expression of the idea and are
expressible in numerous ways, then the court must decide if the unique
elements are a substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable work.
42
defined legal test for determining copyrightability of computer program's nonliteral elements);
infra notes 137-142 and accompanying text (defining elements of proposed three pronged legal
test on computer copyright); see also Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer Software
after Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 54 Mo. L. REv. 121, 132 (1989) (stating
that development of a proper test for computer program copyright infringement remains
unsettled issue).
137. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 60 (D. Mass.
1990) (holding that formulation of idea is necessary for later distinguishing expression of idea
from idea itself).
138. See id. (incorporating abstractions test established by Learned Hand in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931));
In Nichols, Nichols authored and copyrighted the play "Abie's Irish Rose." Nichols, 45 F.2d
at 120. Subsequently, Universal Pictures produced a motion picture play entitled "The Cohens
and the Kellys," and Nichols alleged that Universal Pictures copied his expression embodied
in "Abie's Irish Rose." Id. In addressing this allegation, Judge Learned Hand stated that for
a play, or any given work, as a fact finder methodically omits specific details of the play, the
idea and expression that the play embodies become more and more general. Id. At the most
general level, the title of a play may represent what the play is about. Id. at 121. However,
as a fact finder unveils these layers of increasing generality in a series of abstractions, the fact
finder reaches a point where copyright can no longer protect the particular expression of the
idea. Id. To hold otherwise would permit a playwright to "prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able
to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." Id.; see also infra notes 151-153 and accompanying
text (describing Lotus court's application of idea formulation process).
139. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 60-61 (stating that placing idea of program along scale
of abstraction is not precisely calculable).
140. See id. at 61 (stating that identifying elements of expression of idea is critical to
remainder of analysis).
141. See id. (defining second prong of legal test as analyzing expression of program's
idea).
142. See id. (defining third prong of legal test as determining if expression is substantial
part of copyrighted program). In determining substantiality the Lotus court advocates a
qualitative analysis as well as a quantitative analysis. Id.; see also SAS Inst.v. S & H Computer
Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (stating that question of substantiality is
also question of fact). A quantitatively small part of a copyrighted work may represent a
qualitatively substantial part of the copyrighted work. Id.
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The Lotus court emphasized that this is not a bright line test, and,
thus, the decisionmaker must evaluate several relevant factors.' 43 The court
defined these factors as the relevant characteristics of the copyrighted work,
the relevant characteristics of the allegedly infringing work, and the relevant
circumstances of their development and use.'" By advocating that a deci-
sionmaker consider these factors, the court is emphasizing that a decision-
maker should not focus solely on the copyrighted work in proceeding
through the legal test. 145 By focusing on both programs present in the
infringement suit, the decisionmaker can reach a more sound and informed
conclusion as to the copyright protection afforded the allegedly infringed
program.'"
Satisfaction of this test merely establishes that the allegedly infringed
work is copyrightable.147 The reviewing court must proceed to the remaining
issues involved in a suit for infringement, including whether the allegedly
infringing work actually infringed the copyrighted work. 4 The Lotus court
stated that a benefit of this legal test is that the test reduces the potential
confusion of the decisionmaker by more sharply focusing the issue being
adjudicated. "49 The reason is that the test encourages the advocates involved
to moderate their extreme positions on the scope of copyright protection of
computer programs in favor of more supportable positions that best address
the issue involved.
50
143. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 61 (D. Mass.




147. See id. (stating that satisfying test establishes copyrightability of allegedly infringed
work).
148. See id. (stating remaining issues of infringement suit). Other remaining issues include
whether or not the plaintiff perfected the copyright on the copyrighted work, or proved any
damages because of the infringement. Id.
149. See id. at 62 (describing how Lotus test will aide court by focusing issues for
adjudication).
150. See id. (describing how Lotus test will effect positions that advocates adopt in arguing
for and against copyright protection for computer programs). The advocate for the copyright
owner will encourage the court to adopt a very generalized idea of the copyrighted work. Id.
If the court defines the idea generally, then there will be many possible expressions of the
idea. Id. The result is that the copyright owner's expression will be one among many, and the
court will extend copyright protection to the copyright owner's expression. Id. The advocate
for the owner of the allegedly infringing work will encourage the court to adopt a very
particularized idea of the copyrighted work. Id. If the court defines the idea very specifically,
then the court's definition will limit the number of available expressions of the idea. Id. The
result is that the court will hold that the copyright owner's expression is one of a limited
number of possible expressions, and, therefore, not entitled to copyright protection. Id.
However, if either advocate advances too extreme a position, the idea will lose credibility
when the debate forces the advocate to propose a less extreme and more sensible position at
a later time. Id.
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Having established a framework for analysis, the court proceeded to
address the particular facts of Lotus' copyright infringement claim.' 5' The
court stated that the general idea of the two programs was the idea of an
electronic spreadsheet.'12 On a more specific level, the court defined the
idea of the two programs as an electronic spreadsheet that utilized a two-
line moving cursor as a user interface. 5
The court next addressed the specific elements of the expression em-
bodied in the Lotus program. 54 Under this analysis the court determined
that several aspects of the Lotus expression were not copyrightable because
of limited expression and merger.'55 These elements included the rotated
"L" screen display, the keys used to invoke the command menus and move
the cursor, and the symbols used to perform mathematic calculations.156
The court, however, extended copyright protection to the structure, se-
quence, and organization of the command menu system. 57 In doing this,
the court emphasized the distinction between the idea of a menu command
system and the expression of a menu command structure. 5 While a menu
command system is not copyrightable as an idea, the structural format of
a menu command structure is expressible in many different ways. 's9 Based
151. Id.
152. See id. at 65 (stating that idea of electronic spreadsheet is not copyrightable because
it is functional and obvious).
153. See id. (stating that two line moving cursor menu is functional and obvious). The
Lotus court noted that many different programs utilize a two-line moving cursor menu, and
copyright protection did not extend to the idea of a two-line moving cursor menu. Id. However,
the Lotus court stated that copyright protection might extend to a particular expression of a
two-line moving cursor menu if the expression included original and distinctive elements beyond
those essential to stating the idea itself. Id.
154. See id. (stating that issue is whether Lotus program goes beyond those details essential
to any expression of electronic spreadsheet and includes substantial elements of expression that
are distinctive and original and, thus, copyrightable).
155. See id. at 66-67 (discussing expressive aspects of Lotus program that copyright does
not protect); supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing limited expression and
merger doctrine).
156. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66 (D. Mass.
1990) (describing elements of expression not entitled to copyright protection).
157. See id. at 67 (stating that structure, sequence, and organization of menu command
system may contain distinctive elements of expression not necessary to every expression of
electronic spreadsheet idea (citing Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222,
1248 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)). The Lotus court stated that a
particular expression of a menu structure is not essential to electronic spreadsheet idea. Id.
Furthermore, the Lotus court stated that a particular expression of a menu structure does not
merge with a less abstract idea of a menu structure for an electronic spreadsheet because the
idea of a menu structure is expressible in an unlimited number of ways. Id.
158. See id. (describing menu command structure as expression of menu command system
idea).
159. See id. (comparing menu command structures of competing electronic spreadsheet
programs and describing specific elements subject to different expression). Although some of
the specific command terms "merge" with the idea of the command term, this merger does
not preclude copyrightability as a "compilation" under the Copyright Act for the command
structure taken as a whole. Id.
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on this analysis, the court held that the Lotus menu command structure
was an original and nonobvious way of expressing a command structure
that fell within the protection of copyright law.'1°
Having decided that copyright law protects the specific menu command
structure of Lotus, the court proceeded to the "substantial aspect" portion
of the legal test to determine if copyright protection should extend to the
Lotus command structure.1'6 The court stated that this portion of the test
answered itself under the circumstances because the menu command struc-
ture is Lotus' most unique and important aspect. 62 With all three prongs
of the legal test sufficiently addressed and answered, the court concluded
that copyright law protected the menu command structure.
6
The Lotus decision is the latest in a long line of computer program
copyright cases that have produced little accord in this unsettled area of
law.'64 Because of recent trends in the computer software industry, the need
for a common framework of analysis never has been greater. 6s For example,
after the Lotus ruling, Lotus immediately filed copyright infringement suits
against two other competitors. 166 Software companies now view lawsuits as
a tool not only to protect their products, but also to bolster their balance
sheets by raising much needed cash. 67 Thus, courts must resolve computer
copyright law by devising a consistent test for computer copyright protection.
Despite the lack of an appellate affirmation, 68 the Lotus decision
represents a comprehensive and workable framework for deciding computer
program copyright infringement cases. 69 The first prong of the Lotus test




164. See supra notes 56-163 and accompanying text (discussing present confusion in area
of copyright protection for computer programs).
165. See Daily Telegraph, Aug. 26, 1990, at 22, col. 1 (stating that legal battles over
intellectual property will proliferate in computer programming industry).
166. See MACWEEK, July 10, 1990, at 113 (stating that immediately after Lotus ruling,
Lotus filed infringement suit against Borland International and Santa Cruz Operation).
167. See Richards, Firms Cash In On Patent Cases, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1990, at HI,
col. I (stating that drive to cash in on intellectual property is picking up steam as country's
one-time technological powerhouses find it harder and harder to compete against Asian
conglomerates and nimble start-ups at home).
168. See Alexander, Lotus Development to Get $500,000 in Copyright Case, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 18, 1990, at B4, col. 4 (reporting that following Lotus decision Lotus and Paperback
Software settled out of court). As part of the settlement, Paperback Software agreed not to
appeal the Lotus decision. Id.; see also Ould, Experts See Further Turbulence as Copyright
Law Establishes Itself, PC WEEK, July 16, 1990, at 116 (stating that Lotus decision is not
binding on other courts). Without an affirmation on appeal, other courts may discount the
precedential value of the Lotus ruling and continue to develop their own analytical frameworks.
Id.
169. See Antton and Hoffman, Copyright Protection and Innovation: The Impact of
Lotus Development v. Paperback Software, 7 THE CoMPUTER LAWYER, Aug. 1990, 1, 4 (stating
that three part test of Lotus should prove far easier to apply in practice than overly broad,
conclusive dictum of Whelan).
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focuses the fact finder's attention on the idea underlying the allegedly
infringed program; defining the underlying idea of the program is the logical
place to start this analysis.1 70 Although conceptualizing the idea may be
difficult, the process will provide insight into the various ways to express
the idea and into the overall complexity of the idea.' 7 ' Once the court
sufficiently formulates the idea, the second prong of the Lotus test directs
the court to focus the analysis on the particular expression of the idea
embodied in the program. 72 This shift in focus automatically brings the
goals of copyright law into play because the fact finder must weigh the
originality of the author's expression against the number of available ex-
pressions of the idea.73 However, the Lotus court warned that, under this
second prong, a reviewing court should not resort to a "look and feel"
analysis to determine the copyrightability of the elements of a computer
program. ' 74 The third prong of the Lotus test forces the court to limit the
extension of copyright protection only to expressions that represent sub-
stantial portions of the computer program. 75 This limitation on the extension
of copyright protection is beneficial to the software industry because pro-
grammers can focus on significant innovations while not constantly worrying
170. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (describing first prong of Lotus test).
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text (describing second prong of Lotus
test).
173. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 58 (D. Mass.
1990) (stating that second prong of Lotus test forces court to weigh competing goals of
copyright law).
174. See id. at 62-63 (explaining why courts should avoid doctrine of "look and feel" as
distinguishing between copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements).
The "look and feel" doctrine is a recent theory advanced by copyright registrants in
computer copyright infringement cases that purports to supplant the traditional claim that a
competitor has infringed a program copyright by copying the program's expression of an idea.
See L. KtrrrN, supra note 2, § 2.03[4][a] (stating that in increasing number of cases copyright
owners are claiming that alleged infringer copied "look and feel" of registered program).
Under the "look and feel" approach, a copyright owner files suit alleging that the infringer
has violated his copyright by copying the program's user interface to such an extent that a
typical program user cannot distinguish between the two programs. Id. In defense, the infringers
claim that the "look and feel" of the registered program represents only the idea of the
program and, thus, copyright does not protect the "look and feel" of the program. Id.
However, despite the new packaging, the "look and feel" doctrine still encompasses the basic
elements of idea and expression, and counsel should still apply the traditional idea or expression
distinction in advancing copyright infringement claims. Id.
The Lotus court rejected the "look and feel" doctrine as a basis for distinguishing
between the copyrightable and noncopyrightable noniteral elements of a computer program.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58. Courts should only use the look and feel doctrine to determine
whether or not improper copying has occurred. Id. If courts use the "look and feel" doctrine
to determine copyrightability, the courts may assume that because two programs look alike,
copyright law extends to the similar portions of the copyrighted program. Id. The look and
feel doctrine, consequently, forces courts to reach a conclusion of copyrightability without
addressing the reasons for extending copyright protection under the competing goals of the
copyright law. Id.
175. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (describing third prong of Lotus test).
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about infringing relatively insignificant portions of another author's work.'176
Industry participants may feel uneasy with the Lotus test because they
cannot easily determine the portions of a program that copyright law protects
and does not protect. 77 This difficulty of application, however, may work
in favor of industry competitors because the Lotus test provides more
narrow copyright protection to any given computer program by forcing
courts to define the idea of the program beyond the most general level.
7 8
If a court defines the idea of a computer program very generally, then the
range of protectible expressions becomes very broad. 179 As the court defines
the idea of a computer program more specifically, the range of protectible
expressions necessarily narrows. 8 0
A comparison of the Whelan test and the Lotus test illustrates that the
range of protectible expression narrows as the courts define the idea of a
computer program more specifically.' Under the Whelan test the idea of
a computer program is the program's purpose or function, and the expres-
sion of a computer program's idea is everything that is not necessary to
the program's purpose or function.'8 2 To satisfy the Whelan test a court
only needs to determine the general purpose or function of the computer
program.'83 Once the court defines the purpose or function of the computer
program, the court immediately proceeds to determine if the alleged ex-
pressions of the program's idea are necessary to the program's purpose or
function.' 8 4 The court then extends copyright protection to any expression
that is not necessary to the purpose or function of the computer program
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 137-144 and accompanying text (describing that Lotus test is not
bright line test); see also Petraske, An Infringement Test for Comprehensive Similarity in
Software Cases, 7 Tim COMPUTER LAWYER, Aug. 1990, 12, 21 (stating that for copyright
protection test to be of any value, competitor must be able to apply test to decide what is
protectible and what is not protected). Although difficult, the Lotus test is at least of some
help in identifying that which is protected from that which is available for copying. Id.
178. See Petraske, supra note 177, at 20-21 (explaining that more general definition of
idea creates broader range of copyrightable expression).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text (describing that range of protectible
expressions of computer program idea narrows as court defines idea of computer program
more specifically).
182. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (describing Whelan test for determining
copyrightability of computer programs).
183. See NIM1MER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 [F] at 13-62.27-62.28 (1990) (stating that Whelan
court failed to realize that more than one idea may underlie general purpose or function of
computer program). Nimmer stated that "[t]he Whelan court eschewed Judge Hand's advice
and adopted a simplistic test for separating idea from expression in cases involving computer
programs.... The crucial flaw in this reasoning is that it assumes that only one idea, in
copyright law terms, underlies any computer program, and that once a separable idea can be
identified, everything else must be expression." Id.
184. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (describing Whelan test for determining
copyrightability of computer programs).
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as long as the expression does not merge with the idea because of a limited
number of available expressions. 185
If the Lotus court had followed the Whelan test without modification,
the Lotus court would have provided the Lotus program with much greater
protection. 8 6 The Lotus court initially defined the idea of the Lotus program
as an electronic spreadsheet.' Under the Whelan test, the Lotus court
would have stopped defining the idea of the Lotus program at this level
and addressed the expressions embodied in the Lotus program.'88 The Lotus
court would have focused on the two-line moving cursor menu as an
expression of the electronic spreadsheet idea embodied in the Lotus pro-
gram. 8 9 As an expression, the two line moving cursor menu is not essential
to the purpose or function of the Lotus program because many ways of
expressing a menu exist.' 90 Consequently, under the Whelan test, the Lotus
court would have ruled that copyright protection extended to the Lotus
program's expression of a two-line moving cursor menu.' 9' This holding
would have been detrimental because such a holding would prohibit any
computer programmer from using a two-line moving cursor menu in a
competing electronic spreadsheet program. 92
Nevertheless, some observers have criticized the Lotus decision as ex-
tending copyright protection to an element of the Lotus program that is
inherently utilitarian and, therefore, generally unprotectible 93 The end user
185. Id.
186. See infra notes 187-192 and accompanying text (discussing how Whelan test would
provide Lotus program with greater copyright protection than Lotus test).
187. See Lotus v. Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990) (stating that
at most general level computer programs under consideration are expressions of idea of
computer program for electronic spreadsheet).
188. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (stating that Whelan test assumes that
only one idea underlies general purpose or function of computer program).
189. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (stating that electronic spreadsheet is most
general idea underlying Lotus program).
190. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67 (describing varied forms menu screen may assume).
Some of the many forms that a menu screen may assume include a one line menu, a three
line menu, a four line menu, a pull down or vertical menu, and a command driven interface.
Id.
191. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing that under Whelan test if
numerous ways of achieving purpose or function of computer program exist, specific way
chosen is not necessary to purpose or function of computer program and, thus, is protectible
expression).
192. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (describing elements of copyright
infringement suit and importance of idea or expression distinction in determining copyright
protection of register work). Ownership of a valid copyright registration raises a rebuttable
presumption that copyright protection subsists in the registered work. Id. The owner of an
allegedly infringing work can rebut this presumption by proving that copyright law does not
protect the allegedly infringed portions of the copyrighted work. Id. If the Lotus court held
that the two-line moving cursor menu in the Lotus program was protectible expression, then
no competing programmer, could utilize the two-line moving cursor menu and survive a
copyright infringement suit' Id.
193. See Abramson, Why Lotus - Paperback Uses the Wrong Test and What the New
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uses the command menu interface to interact with the computer program,
and, consequently, the user interface provides utility to the computer pro-
gram. 194 Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act denies copyright protection of
utilitarian elements except where artistic elements are separable from the
utilitarian aspect. 9 ' Although copyright law does not protect a utilitarian
element, copyright law does protect a programmer's expression of a utili-
tarian element. 96 A court may have difficulty distinguishing the unprotectible
utilitarian elements of a computer program from the protectible expressions
of the utilitarian elements,197 but the Lotus decision illustrates that the
formulation of a good idea will facilitate this distinction. 9s Under the Lotus
facts, the Lotus programmer used the two-line moving cursor menu as the
process or method to communicate with the user. 99 The particular Lotus
command structure within the two-line moving cursor menu is the program-
mer's expression of the process or method embodied in the two-line moving
cursor menu. 200
Observers also consider the first part of the Lotus test to be susceptible
to error because the test provides no guidelines for a court to know at what
level of specificity to stop defining the idea of a program. 201 This vulnera-
bility disturbs observers because this portion of the test effects the remainder
of the court's analysis.202 Although observers may consider this vulnerability
detrimental, Congress wisely has mandated this vulnerability by refusing to
Software Protection Legislation Should Look Like, 7 THE COMPUTER LAWYER, Aug. 1990, 6
(stating that Lotus decision threatens to upset many widely-held beliefs and related practices
in computer and software industries).
194. See id. at 7 (stating that interactive elements of program and other results produced
by operation of program have utility).
195. See Copyright Act, supra note 1, § 102(b) (describing limitations on copyright
protection for utilitarian elements).
196. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 5670 (expanding on legislative intent underlying
Copyright Act § 102(b)). The HousE REPORT states that "[slection 102(b) is intended, among
other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable
element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the
program are not within the scope of the copyright law." Id.
197. See Abramson, supra note 193, at 7 (arguing that separating expressive aspects from
utilitarian aspects of software often is made more difficult by fact that utility of computer
program results largely from communication of information to and from user). The expression
of a computer program is largely a result of the communication of information to and from
the end user. Id. Accordingly, a fact finder possibly may characterize certain communication
as expression and also may determine that the communication is an inseparable part of the
program's utilitarian function. Id.
198. See supra notes 151-160 and accompanying text (discussing Lotus court's application
of Lotus test to Lotus electronic spreadsheet).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text (discussing that no bright line rules
exist for defining idea of program under first prong of Lotus test).
202. See infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text (describing how formulation of idea
as first step of Lotus test can adversely affect remainder of analysis).
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create a bright line test for copyright protection and instead placing properly
in the hands of the courts the task of balancing the competing goals of
copyright law.203 By permitting the courts to consider the applicable copy-,
right protection for a computer program on an ad hoc basis, Congress has
ensured that copyright law will remain flexible enough to protect both
present and future technological developments in the computer software
industry.? 4
The Lotus test forces a court to determine the idea of the computer
program as the very first step, and this determination greatly effects the
results in the remaining two steps. 205 However, computer programs often
are complex, and the end user often cannot discern this underlying com-
plexity.2°6 If the court cannot sufficiently formulate the program's idea,
then the court cannot sufficiently seliarate the copyrightable expression from
the idea, and, consequently, the entire test will fail. 207 To formulate the
idea of a computer program, the Lotus test currently permits the court to
consider the suggestions of counsel and anticipates that the suggestions of
counsel will more sharply focus the issues.2 8 If the court cannot sufficiently
formulate the idea of the computer program with the aid of counsel, the
Lotus test should permit the court to admit expert testimony to clarify the
issue.2°9 If the court still cannot sufficiently formulate the idea of the
program, then the court should hold that copyright law does not protect
the nonliteral elements of the program because the court cannot separate
the idea and the expression of the program.21 0
Although the Lotus test attempts to force courts to apply the merger
doctrine when determining the copyrightability of computer program ex-
pressions, courts consistently have applied the merger doctrine improperly.2"
The courts usually have failed to properly apply the merger doctrine when
203. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text (describing Congressional mandates
underlying Copyright Act).
204. Id.
205. See Abramson, supra note 193, at 6 (stating that court draws line between expression
and idea as very first step of Lotus test analysis). Once a court establishes the idea of the
computer program, the remainder of the Lotus test analysis flows directly from this determi-
nation. Id.
206. See id. at 7 (stating that underlying complexity of well constructed software system
is often nearly invisible to end user).
207. See id. (stating that inevitably fact finder will formulate idea too broadly and Lotus
test will fail). The analysis fails because when the fact finder formulates the idea too broadly,
the remainder of the analysis characterizes anything else of significance as expression. Id.
208. See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text (describing benefits of Lotus test in
permitting counsel to assist in formulating idea of program).
209. Id. Courts may want to admit expert testimony at this early stage of the trial in
every instance because the formulation of the program's idea is essential to the remainder of
the analysis. Id. Without expert testimony the court may not know if the court properly has
formulated the idea of the program. Id.
210. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing lack of copyright protection
for expressions that are inseparable from idea they express).
211. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing merger doctrine).
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other programs exist that compete with the allegedly infringed program, but
the other manufacturers are not named defendants in the infringement
suit.22 The courts rely on the existence of these competing programs to
establish that other methods are available to accomplish the same function,
but in different and original ways. 213 Therefore, the courts rule that the
particular expression embodied in the program at issue is entitled to copy-
right protection. 214 The fallacy of this analogy is that the existence of other
programs that accomplish the same function in a different manner merely
indicates that other forms of expression exist.2 5 The existence of these other
programs alone does not prove that an unlimited number of other expres-
sions are available. 2 6 However, by following this analogy, reviewing courts
conclude that the number of available expressions is unlimited without
actually addressing whether or not only a limited number of possible
expressions actually exist.2 7 Therefore, the issue remains as to how many
different expressions must be available before "limited number" is no longer
a concern.
One consideration is that although a programmer may choose from an
unlimited number of expressions to accomplish a desired function, the forces
of the marketplace may limit the commercially viable expressions. 2' The
reason is that "any expression" will not suffice because the expression must
be one that the programmer's audience will accept. 2 9 An extremely successful
program may further decrease the number of commercially acceptable
expressions by setting a standard that computer users will use to judge all
other programs. 220 Denying copyright protection to a program's expression
because the program is successful violates the copyright goal of encouraging
the generation of new ideas that will improve the public welfare.'22 If,
however, protection of the expression retards innovation, the protection
offends the copyright goal of not allowing protection that is detrimental to
the best interests of the public.'
Courts must resolve this conflict by balancing the goals of copyright
protection to reach some form of compromise.2 The Lotus test represents
212. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing how Broderbund court
relied on market presence of one competing computer program to determine that many ways






218. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing increasing importance of
understanding user's needs in designing program that users will accept).
219. Id.
220. Id.






a workable compromise to resolve the copyright conflict between the merger
doctrine and the limited availability of commercially viable expressions. The
Lotus test provides the most comprehensive framework for the copyright
analysis of a computer program because the Lotus court based the test on
a strict reading of the Congressional mandates embodied in the Copyright
Act.?4 Although courts in other jurisdictions do not have to follow the
Lotus decision as precedent, courts in other jurisdictions should follow the
Lotus test. As other courts follow and apply the Lotus test, the courts will
develop a comprehensive and coherent body of law pertaining to the
copyrightability of computer programs. This body of law will then provide
the software industry with better guidelines to judge the copyrightability of
their future works contrasted with the confusion that still exists today.
Clark H. Worthy
224. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 47 (D. Mass.
1990) (stating that court must examine relevant language of copyright statute, provisions of
whole law, and object and policy of copyright statute in determining if copyright protection
extends to nonliteral elements of computer program).
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